Research publications

Arun Advani, Arnaud Dyèvre, Sebastian Gazmuri-Barker, Helen Hughson, Sanaya Mahajan and Andy Summers (2026)

This paper introduces the Business-to-Worker Register (BWR), a database of the universe of UK workers linked to the universe of UK businesses and non-businesses from 2002 to 2022. To build the BWR, we combine (i) information on characteristics and outcomes from individual and business tax returns, (ii) administrative links between businesses and workers, and (iii) external data sources including on patents and business financial accounts.

Unlike standard Linked Employer Employee Datasets (LEEDs), the BWR includes all businesses and non-businesses with no restriction on legal form, industrial sector, employer status, or size. On the worker side, non-employment relationships such as partnerships and self-employment are included, there is no restriction on the age of workers or residency status, and all jobs are observed. We develop methods to estimate profits, investments, capital stocks and depreciations from firm tax returns. To benchmark the BWR, we compare worker and business populations to official estimates. We also benchmark our estimates of firm-level variables against external financial accounts.

Arun Advani, Sebastian Gazmuri-Barker and Andy Summers (2026)

British Tax Review, (2), 136-160

This article argues that the UK’s approach to taxing capital gains in the presence of international mobility is anomalous among its international peers, and should be reformed. Using a reference group of 21 comparator jurisdictions, we classify the main models for taxing individuals who arrive in, and depart from, a country for CGT purposes. On arrivals, we distinguish regimes that tax the pre-arrival gains of immigrants in full, preferential regimes for foreign gains, and ‘rebasing on arrival’ (ROA). On departures, we compare ‘deemed disposal on departure’ (DDD), ‘tails’ and other hybrids shaped by EU law, and the UK’s temporary non-resident regime. Our preferred model combines ROA with DDD: exempting pre-arrival gains while ensuring that gains accrued during UK residence are taxed on departure. We argue that ROA-DDD would be feasible within the UK’s existing treaty framework and offers an opportunity to shift towards an improved global equilibrium for the taxation of capital gains when individuals migrate.

Arun Advani, Andy Summers, Hannah Tarrant (2025)

European Economic Review, Vol 178

We examine how the measurement of aggregate wealth affects our understanding of wealth distribution. We explain why choices over wealth aggregates can affect the measured level and composition of wealth concentration. Applying this to the UK, we find estimates of the top 1% wealth share vary by 2.1pp – between 14.4% and 16.5% – in 2016–18, depending on the choices we make regarding aggregates and the source of distributional information. Alternative definitions for aggregates lead to a reranking of who is at the top, replacing 40% of individuals in the top 1%, and changing the share of women and older individuals. We discuss conceptual and measurement issues with the National Accounts as a source of wealth aggregates, and argue that in many cases they are poorly aligned in both regards with the measure of personal wealth one would like to target, and in practice are less comparable internationally than they initially seem. In the UK, where the wealth survey has reasonably good coverage across the distribution, we therefore prefer survey aggregates.

Sam Friedman, Victoria Gronwald, Andy Summers, Emma Taylor (2025)

Socio-Economic Review, Vol 23, Issue 3, July 2025, 1091–1112

Many countries are concerned about the migration of top taxpayers. Yet we know little about how economic elites weigh the taxes they pay when deciding where to live. Existing evidence on tax flight is either quantitative or comes from wealthy individuals issuing warnings in the media. Drawing on in-depth interviews with thirty-five individuals in the top 1 per cent of the wealth distribution in the UK, we find a striking stigma attached to tax migration. Participants disparaged those who move for tax purposes and several characterized low-tax destinations as boring and culturally barren. Yet the most important factor restraining tax migration was the attachment to London as a place to work and live, particularly its unparalleled highbrow cultural infrastructure. These findings demonstrate that wealthy individuals often choose to prioritize investments in place-specific cultural capital above the relatively small gains in economic capital associated with tax migration.

Arun Advani, Felix Koenig, Lorenzo Pessina, Andy Summers (2025)

The Review of Economics and Statistics, 107(4), 1123–1135.

Using administrative data on the universe of U.K. taxpayers, we study the contribution of migrants to the rise in U.K. top incomes. We show that migrants are over-represented at the top of the income distribution, with migrants twice as prevalent in the top 0.01% as anywhere in the bottom 97% of taxpayers. These high incomes are predominantly from labor, rather than capital, and migrants are concentrated in only a handful of industries, predominantly finance. All of the observed growth in the U.K. top 1% income share over the past 20 years has accrued to migrants.

Arun Advani, Felix Koenig, Lorenzo Pessina, Andy Summers (2024)

The Review of Economics and Statistics, 106(1), 1–31.

Using administrative data on the universe of UK taxpayers, we study the contribution of migrants to the rise in UK top incomes. We show migrants are over-represented at the top of the income distribution, with migrants twice as prevalent in the top 0.01% as anywhere in the bottom 97% of taxpayers. These high incomes are predominantly from labour, rather than capital, and migrants are concentrated in only a handful of industries, predominantly finance. All of the observed growth in the UK top 1% income share over the past 20 years has accrued to migrants.

Media coverage:
Coverage in Forbes, FT, and Guardian. Op-ed in the Times.

Sam Friedman, Victoria Gronwald, Andrew Summers and Emma Taylor (2024)

International Inequalities Institute (III) Working Paper no. 131

Britain’s policymakers, like many around the world, are concerned about the emigration of
top taxpayers in response to tax policy. Existing evidence on this kind of tax flight is either
quantitative or comes from a handful of high-profile individuals issuing politicised warnings
about tax migration in the media. We know little about how the wealthy actually consider their
tax burden when making decisions about where to live. This report summarises new qualitative
research exploring the migration decisions of Britain’s wealthiest and highest earning individuals. Specifically, we draw on in-depth interviews with 35 individuals, all of whom were in the
top 1% of the distribution by income and/or wealth, to explore whether top earners and wealth
holders in Britain would consider migrating for tax reasons and what they value most when
deciding where to live.

Arun Advani, César Poux, Anna Powell-Smith and Andy Summers (2023)

Warwick economics research papers series (WERPS), no. 1480

The Register of Overseas Entities (ROE) was introduced by the government in Spring 2022 with the commitment that it would “require anonymous foreign owners of UK property to reveal their real identities”. We use data released by Companies House and HM Land Registry to assess to what extent the ROE is currently delivering on this aim. We identify and quantify several major ‘gaps’ in the scope and operation of the register and make recommendations for how the register could be improved.

Arun Advani, David Burgherr, and Andy Summers (2023)

IZA Discussion Paper no. 16432, Winner of IIPF Young Economist Award 2023

Using administrative data on the globally connected super-rich in the UK, we study the effect of a large tax reform on migration behaviour. Prior to 2017, offshore investment returns for `non-doms’ – individuals tax-resident in the UK but with connections to other countries – were untaxed. People making use of that tax status are strongly concentrated at the top of the income distribution: 86% are in the UK top 1% and 29% in the top 0.1% once overseas investment income is taken into account. A reform in 2017 brought long-stayers, who had been in the UK for at least 15 of the last 20 years, into the standard tax system, reducing their effective net-of-average-tax rate by 18%. We find that emigration responses were modest: our central estimate is that the emigration rate increases by 0.26 percentage points for a 1% decline in the net-of-tax rate, and we can rule out increases larger than 0.4 percentage points. Dispelling fears that the targeted taxpayers were able to circumvent the tax hike, we find large average increases in income reported and tax paid in the UK of more than 150%.

Arun Advani, Helen Hughson, Andy Summers (2023)

Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol 39, Issue 3, 406–437 

Using anonymized administrative data on the population of UK taxpayers, we show that—in line with high-profile anecdotes about the tax affairs of the rich—effective average tax rates (EATRs) decline at the top of the distribution of income and capital gains. We also document substantial variation in EATRs within remuneration level: a quarter of those in the top 1 per cent pay headline rates, while another quarter pay at least 9pp less than the headline rate. Most of this effect is driven by the composition of remuneration, with investment income having lower tax rates and capital gains having lower rates still. If all individuals with income above £100,000 paid the headline rates, this would raise tax revenue on income and gains by £23 billion on a static basis, an increase of 27 per cent in the tax paid by this group.

Arun Advani, William Elming, Jonathan Shaw (2023)

The Review of Economics and Statistics, 105(3): 545–561.

We study the effects of audits on long run compliance behavior using a random audit program covering more than 53,000 tax returns. We find that audits raise reported tax liabilities for five years after audit, effects are longer-lasting for more stable sources of income, and only individuals found to have made errors respond to audit. A total of 60%–65% of revenue from audit comes from the change in reporting behavior. Extending the standard model of rational tax evasion, we show that these results are best explained by information revealed by audits constraining future misreporting. Together these imply that more resources should be devoted to audits, audit targeting should account for reporting responses, and performing audits has additional value beyond merely threatening them.

Media coverage: 
In context of Paradise Papers: Huffington Post, cross-posted at MSN Money and Yahoo News.
In context of 2018 Tax Gap release: The Times.
In context of 2019 Tax Gap release: Financial Times, Independent, and Tax Notes.
Other mentions: The Economist.

Arun Advani, Andy Summers, Hannah Tarrant (2023)

Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A: Statistics in Society, Vol 186(2), 241–258

Information about the share of total income held by the richest 1%, or other top income groups, is increasingly used to discuss inequality levels and trends within and between nations. A top income share is the ratio of the total income held by the top income group divided by total personal income (the ‘income control total’). We compare two approaches to estimating income control totals: the ‘external’ approach used by the World Inequality Database, and an augmented ‘internal’ approach. We argue in favour of the latter, with reference to five desirable properties that a top share series would ideally possess. The choice matters: our augmented ‘internal’ approach yields estimates of the UK top 1% share that are around 2% points higher than the ‘external’ approach.

Andy Summers (2022)

LSE Public Policy Review (November 2022)

A major constraint on progressive tax reform is that somehow, the richest always seem to find ways not to pay. Is this inevitable? Focusing on the UK context, I begin by reviewing two past attempts to raise taxes on those at the top – the changes to the top rate and dividend rates of income tax, and reforms to ‘non-dom’ tax status – and explore whether and why these policies failed. I then discuss three key policy areas that must be addressed to successfully increase taxes on the super-rich: capital taxes (on capital gains, inheritances and gifts), the challenges posed by international mobility of assets and individuals, and trusts. Reform of these areas could directly raise additional revenue from the super-rich and would also provide a backstop needed to support more familiar levers such as increasing the top income tax rate.

Arun Advani, David Burgherr, Mike Savage and Andy Summers (2022)

CAGE working paper no. 570

In this paper we show the importance of international ties amongst the UK’s global economic elite, by exploiting administrative data derived from tax records. We show how this data can be used to shed light on the kind of transnational dynamics which have long been hypothesised to be of major significance in the UK, but which have previously proved intractable to systematic study. Our work reveals the enduring and distinctive influence of long-term imperial forces, especially to the former ‘white settler’ ex-dominions which have been called the ‘anglosphere’. These are allied to more recent currents associated with European integration and the rise of Asian economic power. Here there are especially strong ties to the ‘old EU-6’ nations of France, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy. The incredible detail and universal coverage of our data means that we can study those at the very top with a level of granularity that would be impossible using traditional survey sources. We find compelling support for the public perception that non-doms are disproportionately highly affluent individuals who can be viewed as a part of a global elite. However, whilst there is some evidence for the stereotype of the global wealthy parking themselves in the UK, this underplays the significance of the working rich. Our analysis also reveals the remarkable concentration of non-doms in central areas of London

Arun Advani, Tahnee Ooms, and Andy Summers (2022)

Journal of Social Policy (2024), 53(2), 386-406.

Policymakers tend to ‘treasure what is measured’ and overlook phenomena that are not. In an era of increased reliance on administrative data, existing policies also often determine what is measured in the first place. We analyse this two-way interaction between measurement and policy in the context of the investment incomes and capital gains that are missing from the UK’s official income statistics. We show that these ‘missing incomes’ change the picture of economic inequality over the past decade, revealing rising top income shares during the period of austerity. The underestimation of these forms of income in official statistics has diverted attention from tax policies that disproportionately benefit the wealthiest. We urge a renewed focus on how policy affects and is affected by measurement.

Arun Advani (2022)

 

Fiscal Studies, Vol 43, 5-22. 

Few topics attract such intense political debate as top tax rates: in the UK, this has led to two top income tax rate reforms since the financial crisis. Recently, the measurement of top incomes and wealth has also proved controversial, in both the UK and the US. The chapter by Delestre et al. (2022) examines both of these issues. It first studies the distribution of income in the UK, focusing on the income sources and demographics of those at the top, as well as non-taxable sources of income. It then describes the current taxation of top incomes, and suggests some directions for reform. Mirroring this structure, in this commentary we discuss first the measurement of financial inequalities, focusing on top income and wealth shares, and then the scope for policy reforms to tackle some of the issues raised, also focusing on the UK.

Arun Advani and Andy Summers (2022)

IFS Deaton Review of Inequalities

Few topics attract such intense political debate as top tax rates: in the UK, this has led to two top income tax rate reforms since the financial crisis. Recently, the measurement of top incomes and wealth has also proved controversial, in both the UK and the US. The chapter by Delestre et al. (2022) examines both of these issues. It first studies the distribution of income in the UK, focusing on the income sources and demographics of those at the top, as well as non-taxable sources of income. It then describes the current taxation of top incomes, and suggests some directions for reform. Mirroring this structure, in this commentary we discuss first the measurement of financial inequalities, focusing on top income and wealth shares, and then the scope for policy reforms to tackle some of the issues raised, also focusing on the UK.

Arun Advani (2021)

CAGE working paper no. 589

Capital gains are particularly complex to tax given their infrequency, the different ways in which they are generated, and worries about harming productivity. There are theoretical arguments in support of everything from zero rates to high rates of tax on capital. In this paper, I first discuss the impact of capital gains on inequality, which often motivates discussions about how gains should be taxed. I then set out the principles that determine how gains should be taxed, in particular how the tax rate should relate to income tax rates. I propose that capital gains tax rates be equalized with income tax rates, subject to provisions to allow gains to be ‘smoothed’ over time and to remove inflation from the tax base. I highlight key transitional issues in moving to such a tax structure. Finally, I discuss the specific lessons for Canada.

This paper was prepared for a special Policy Forum at the Canadian Tax Journal. 

Arun Advani, Helen Miller and Andy Summers (2021)

Fiscal Studies, Vol 42, 389–395

This paper introduces a special issue on a Wealth Tax, which draws together the latest thinking on wealth taxes with the aim of filling this gap. It draws heavily on international experience and evidence, applying these insights to the UK context. The papers build on work undertaken for the Wealth Tax Commission, which delivered its final report in December 2020. The contributors to this special issue include tax practitioners and academic lawyers as well as economists, reflecting our view that this range of expertise is essential to evaluating the practice, as well as principles, of a wealth tax. In this paper we touch upon some common themes arising across the papers. We also highlight some important remaining gaps in the evidence base on wealth taxes, particularly on the measurement of wealth and behavioural responses at the very top of the wealth distribution.

Andy Summers (2021)

Fiscal Studies, Vol 42, 485–507

In this paper, I examine the role of a wealth tax in the context of the UK’s existing taxes on wealth. First, I discuss several ways in which the UK could be said to tax wealth already, and I set out two possible directions for reforming these taxes, highlighting policies that are merited under either approach. Second, I consider whether and under what circumstances a broad-based tax on the ownership of wealth – a ‘wealth tax’ – could be justified instead of or in addition to these reforms. Third, I address how a wealth tax should interact with other taxes, focusing on concerns regarding ‘double taxation’ and (conversely) proposals for an alternative minimum tax based on wealth. I conclude that there is a large degree of consensus amongst existing proposals to reform our current taxes on wealth, and that most of these reforms would be required whether or not a wealth tax is introduced as well.

Arun Advani, Helen Hughson and Hannah Tarrant (2021)

Fiscal Studies, Vol 42, 699–736

In this paper, we model the revenue that could be raised from an annual and a one-off wealth tax of the design recommended by Advani, Chamberlain and Summers in the Wealth Tax Commission’s Final Report (2020). We examine the distributional effects of the tax, in terms of both wealth and other characteristics. We also estimate the share of taxpayers who would face liquidity constraints in meeting their tax liability. We find that an annual wealth tax charging 0.17 per cent on wealth above £500,000 could generate £10 billion in revenue, before administrative costs. Alternatively, a one-off tax charging 4.8 per cent (effectively 0.95 per cent per year, paid over a five-year period) on wealth above the same threshold, would generate £250 billion in revenue. To put our revenue estimates into context, we present revenue estimates and costings for some commonly proposed reforms to the existing set of taxes on capital.

Arun Advani and Hannah Tarrant (2021)

Fiscal Studies, Vol 42, 509–537 

In this paper, we review the existing empirical evidence on how individuals respond to the incentives created by a net wealth tax. Variation in the overall magnitude of behavioural responses is substantial: estimates of the elasticity of taxable wealth vary by a factor of 800. We explore three key reasons for this variation: tax design, context and methodology. We then discuss what is known about the importance of individual margins of response and how these interact with policy choices. Finally, we use our analysis to systematically narrow down and reconcile the range of elasticity estimates. We argue that a well-designed wealth tax would reduce the tax base by 7–17 per cent if levied at a tax rate of 1 per cent.

Arun Advani, George Bangham and Jack Leslie (2021)

Fiscal Studies, Vol 42, 397-430

We show that wealth inequality in the UK is high and has increased slightly over the past decade as financial asset prices have increased in the wake of the financial crisis. But data deficiencies are a major barrier in understanding the true distribution, composition and size of household wealth. The most comprehensive survey of household wealth in the UK does a good job of capturing the vast majority of the wealth distribution, but nearly £800 billion of wealth held by the very wealthiest UK households is missing. We also find tentative evidence that survey measures of high-wealth families undervalue their assets – our central estimate of the true value of wealth held by households in the UK is 5 per cent higher than the survey data suggest.

Arun Advani and Andy Summers (2020)

CAGE working paper no. 465

Aggregate taxable capital gains in UK have tripled in the past decade. Using confidential administrative data on the universe of UK taxpayers, we show that including gains changes the picture of UK inequality over the past two decades. These taxable gains are largely repackaged income, so their exclusion biases the picture of inequality. Including them changes who is at the top of the distribution, adding more business owners and older people. The share of income plus gains (both pre- and post-tax) going to the top 1% is 3pp higher than for income only, and this gap has been steadily rising.

Media coverage for this paper:
Independent, Guardian, Mirror, Evening Standard, Tax Notes, and Global Citizen.
Later discussion in the FT, and Guardian.
Op-eds in the Times, Guardian, and Independent.

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